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AbstrACt
the paper argues first for the immense importance of the question whether 
we possess free will for philosophical anthropology, ethics, penal law, and 
religion, showing that the personhood of man is incompatible with a negation 
of his free will. It proceeds by discussing briefly the essence and levels of 
free will, showing that free will is an irreducible archdatum (urphenomenon) 
that in spite of its indefinability allows for an analysis and unfolding of its 
essential qualities. the paper then distinguishes the different dimensions 
of human free will as cause of action and intentional response to goods and 
values, and discusses their relation to morality. It then shows that the central 
phenomena of “cooperative freedom” and of the “gift of self” are the supreme 
fulfillment of persons. Lastly, different arguments for the actual existence 
of human freedom are explored: a) an argument from the immediate 
evidence of freedom in the cogito; b) from the evidence of “eternal truths” 
or “necessary and supremely intelligible essences” about free will; c) from 
the experience of moral calls and oughts; d) from the undeniability of free 
will without contradiction; and e) from the experience of acts whose objects 
(persons and their acts) presuppose free will. through these “five ways” the 
evidence that we do indeed possess free will can be attained.
KEyWOrds: Free will, personhood, human freedom 
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1. the Immense Importance of the Question Whether We Are Free
There is hardly anything that could be more fundamental for the un-
derstanding of the human being qua person than the comprehension of the 
nature of freedom and an answer to the question whether we humans are in 
fact free. From the onset a purely philosophical grasp of the person is enough 
to see the inseparable link between person and freedom so that one can say 
on purely philosophical-rational grounds: an “unfree person” is a contradictio 
in adiecto, a contradiction in itself – just like “iron wood.”
Freedom belongs so essentially to personhood that no being can be called 
a person if she, in principle and as subject awakened to rational conscious life,1 
were entirely determined from without—by physical forces, by her own nature, 
by other persons, or even by God—rather than being capable of engendering 
acts by her free center, by herself. Even a child’s pre-philosophical experience 
of freedom is enough to see that if a person were not free responsibility and 
morality could not exist, good and evil would be illusions. Without freedom 
there would be no guilt but also no merit; instead, praise and blame would 
be just as senseless as punishment and reward. If this is the case, the moral 
conscience that urges us to do the good even when we hesitate to do it and 
makes present to us our obligations, warns us not to commit evil, or repri-
mands us for having done something wrong, would be based on a big delu-
sion. The act of promising, of breaking or keeping promises, or of giving a gift 
would all cease to be what they are and be reduced to their mere semblance: 
gratitude2 or reproach would all be absurd nonsense. All these dimensions 
1This formulation serves to make explicit the metaphysical fact that a person, for example 
in the embryonic stage or during sleep, can live and be a person without the concrete ability to 
“actualize” her being in consciousness and in free acts.
2Augustine insisted on this. See Augustine, De civitate Dei V, 9:
Quod si ita, nihil est in nostra potestate nullumque est arbitrium voluntatis; 
quod si concedimus, inquit, omnis humana vita subvertitur, frustra 
leges dantur, frustra obiurgationes, laudes, vituperationes exhortationes 
adhibentur, neque ulla iustitia bonis praemia et malis supplicia constituta 
sunt. Haec ergo ne consequantur indigna et absurda et perniciosa rebus 
humanis, non vult esse praescientiam futurorum.
See also Seifert, “From a Phenomenology.”
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so essential to personal human life would be deprived of their foundation if 
human persons were not free.
Thus it is not amazing that we encounter profound statements on hu-
man freedom in philosophers and cultures of all epochs – in Socrates, Plato,3 
Sophocles, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca,4 Augustine, and many others. Aristotle 
left us with possibly the most metaphysical characterization and affirmation 
of human freedom, stating: “For he [man] is the lord over the being and over 
the non-being of his actions.”5 Aristotle calls freedom in other texts “the first 
principle,” “the cause,” and the “master of action.”6 Hence the common—partly 
Hegelian7—opinion that only Christianity introduced the idea that all hu-
3On the philosophy of freedom in Socrates see Xenophon, Memorabilia, II, 1,2; IV,5,3. 
See also how Plato’s writings on freedom, including the relevant passages from Apology, Crito, 
Gorgias, and many other dialogues in which personal responsibility, the choice between justice and 
injustice, virtue, the epimeleia tes psyches (the care of one’s soul), the judgment of the soul after 
life, etc., all presuppose freedom, but also see the more specific texts on free choice (prohairesis) 
in Alcibiades 135 c; Crito 45 e; 7th Letter, 329 b, and for its clearest exposition in Republic 617 
d-e (the Woodcock version):
When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; but 
first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he took from 
the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having mounted a high 
pulpit, spoke as follows: ‘Hear the word of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. 
Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and mortality. Your genius will not be 
allotted to you, but you will choose your genius; and let him who draws the 
first lot have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. 
Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or 
less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser—God is without guilt.’ 
Phaidros 249b: 
And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil souls 
both come to draw lots and choose their second life, and they may take any 
which they please.
4See Seneca, De Beneficiis III.xvii.3-4; III.xix.2 – III.xx.
5See Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics II.vi.8–9; 1223 a 3 ff.: “hoon ge kurios esti tou einai kai tou 
mee einai.”
6See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III; and Magna Moralia, 87 b 31 ff., especially 89 b 6 ff.
7See Hegel 12/28:
Der Geist im Gegenteil ist eben das, in sich den Mittelpunkt zu haben; er hat 
nicht die Einheit außer sich, sondern er hat sie gefunden; er ist in sich selbst 
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man beings are free is not true. We find it very clearly expressed in ancient 
thought, not only in Plato and Aristotle, but also in Seneca’s magnificent texts 
that insist that even slaves are free qua human beings.8 Nonetheless, what 
remains true in Hegel’s position is that a full acknowledgment of human, 
angelic and divine freedom is indeed far more clearly and centrally contained in 
the contents of the Christian faith than in any other religion or philosophy: 
und bei sich selbst. Die Materie hat ihre Substanz außer ihr; der Geist ist das 
Bei-sich-selbst-Sein. Dies eben ist die Freiheit, denn wenn ich abhängig bin, 
so beziehe ich mich auf ein Anderes, das ich nicht bin; ich kann nicht sein ohne 
ein Äußeres; frei bin ich, wenn ich bei mir selbst bin. Dieses Beisichselbstsein 
des Geistes ist Selbstbewußtsein, das Bewußtsein von sich selbst. Zweierlei ist 
zu unterscheiden im Bewußtsein, erstens, daß ich weiß, und zweitens, was 
ich weiß. Beim Selbstbewußtsein fällt beides zusammen, denn der Geist weiß 
sich selbst, er ist das Beurteilen seiner eigenen Natur, und er ist zugleich die 
Tätigkeit, zu sich zu kommen und so sich hervorzubringen, sich zu dem zu 
machen, was er an sich ist. Nach dieser abstrakten Bestimmung kann von der 
Weltgeschichte gesagt werden, daß sie die Darstellung des Geistes sei, wie er 
sich das Wissen dessen, was er an sich ist, erarbeitet; und wie der Keim die 
ganze Natur des Baumes, den Geschmack, die Form der Früchte in sich trägt, 
so enthalten auch schon die ersten Spuren des Geistes virtualiter die ganze 
Geschichte. Die Orientalen wissen es noch nicht, daß der Geist oder der 
Mensch als solcher an sich frei ist; weil sie es nicht wissen, sind sie es nicht; sie 
wissen nur, daß Einer frei ist, aber ebendarum ist solche Freiheit nur Willkür, 
Wildheit, Dumpfheit der Leidenschaft oder auch eine Milde, Zahmheit 
derselben, die selbst nur ein Naturzufall oder eine Willkür ist. Dieser Eine ist 
darum nur ein Despot, nicht ein freier Mann. – In den Griechen ist erst das 
Bewußtsein der Freiheit aufgegangen, und darum sind sie frei gewesen; aber 
sie, wie auch die Römer, wußten nur, daß einige frei sind, nicht der Mensch 
als solcher. Dies wußten selbst Platon und Aristoteles nicht. Darum haben 
die Griechen nicht nur Sklaven gehabt und ist ihr Leben und der Bestand 
ihrer schönen Freiheit daran gebunden gewesen, sondern auch ihre Freiheit 
war selbst teils nur eine zufällige, vergängliche und beschränkte Blume, teils 
zugleich eine harte Knechtschaft des Menschlichen, des Humanen. – Erst die 
germanischen Nationen sind im Christentum zum Bewußtsein gekommen, 
daß der Mensch als Mensch frei [ist], die Freiheit des Geistes seine eigenste 
Natur ausmacht. Dies Bewußtsein ist zuerst in der Religion, in der innersten 
Region des Geistes aufgegangen; aber dieses Prinzip auch in das weltliche 
Wesen einzubilden, das war eine weitere Aufgabe, welche zu lösen und 
auszuführen eine schwere lange Arbeit der Bildung erfordert.
8See Seneca, De Beneficiis III.xvii-xx.
43
Asian Perspectives in the Arts and Humanities 1:2 (2011): 39–77
Christianity (but also Judaism and Islam) would be an absurdity without 
human and divine freedom.9 Without the person possessing freedom, which 
implies that the free subject is not wholly determined by nature or by any 
cause extrinsic to herself, none of the chief Christian beliefs would be true. 
One might say without exaggeration that the entire internal structure of the 
Christian faith—or at the very least its logical conditions—would break down 
if humans and angels, and if God did not truly possess freedom. Let us see 
this more distinctly in the following.
1. Without acknowledging the freedom of the created person, God would be the origin 
of all evils and thus a hyper-demonic being. Every metaphysics that denies the free-
dom of humans and of angels, and therefore does not recognize the abuse of 
freedom as the source and first cause of all the manifold evils that obviously 
exist in the world, blames these evils on God10 or—if one is an atheist—on an 
unfree natural cause. In either of these two cases moral evil would not exist at 
all among human beings. Without freedom, even if humans and angels were 
determined to be evil, they would be innocent like lambs or like puppets. On 
the other hand, God, as long as His existence is not altogether denied, be-
comes the source of all evil and suffering and would himself be evil. Therefore 
the denial of human and angelic freedom either leads to atheism or to polythe-
ism, or to a transformation of God into a super-demon—infinitely more terrible 
than Satan, because all evils from the beginning to the end of the world would 
be God’s fault alone, which cannot be said of Satan.11 In contrast to Satan’s 
limited causal role regarding other evils besides his own—if man and angels 
were not free and if therefore, granted his existence, God had brought into 
the world all meanness, all lies, all adulteries, all perjuries, rapes, murders, 
thefts, tortures, hate and envy, genocide and other crimes (including Satan’s 
and his angels’ sins) or if He had determined angels and humans to commit 
them, He would be the only ultimate source of evil. One cannot imagine a 
more terrible destruction of the idea of God. God would be an Anti-God. In 
9I do not overlook the denial of ultimate freedom in some other Christian confessions, in 
contrast to the insistence upon it in Catholic faith. But philosophically speaking, it remains true: 
Christian faith without there being human and divine freedom is an absurdity!
10Except if there are different gods or first principles of good and evil, as the Manicheans thought.
11In principle this was an idea of Jean Calvin, who thought that the devil could not have done 
anything about the fact that he was determined from eternity by God to evil.
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this case, Ivan Karamazov’s12 rebellion against God as responsible for all evils 
would be wholly justified.13
2. Without divine freedom there could not be any contingent world and particularly 
no created free person. The origin of non-necessary beings in the world, and 
particularly of created free agents, could not be explained without creation 
being a free act of God, because a contingent and temporal world cannot 
proceed from God by a necessity rooted in the eternal and necessary divine 
nature14 but only from a free divine choice. Even more clearly: never could 
12A figure from Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov.
13It is interesting to note here that these terrible consequences of the negation of human 
freedom for the ideas of both man and God was a major reason why some of the early Buddhists 
denied the existence of a Creator-God. They wrongly believed that if He existed, it would be He and 
not we who would bear responsibility for evil, which is absurd. See the interesting article: http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God_in_Buddhism:
In early Buddhism, in the Titha Sutta AN 3.61, Buddha clearly states that 
‘reliance and belief’ in creation by a supreme being leads to lack of effort and 
inaction:
Having approached the priests and contemplatives who hold that... ‘Whatever 
a person experiences... is all caused by a supreme being’s act of creation,’ I 
said to them: ‘Is it true that you hold that... “Whatever a person experiences... 
is all caused by a supreme being’s act of creation?”‘ Thus asked by me, they 
admitted, ‘Yes.’
Then I said to them, ‘Then in that case, a person is a killer of living beings 
because of a supreme being’s act of creation. A person is a thief... unchaste... 
a liar... a divisive speaker... a harsh speaker... an idle chatterer... greedy... 
malicious... a holder of wrong views because of a supreme being’s act of 
creation.’
When one falls back on creation by a supreme being as being essential, 
monks, there is no desire, no effort [at the thought], ‘This should be done. This 
shouldn’t be done.’ When one can’t pin down as a truth or reality what should 
and shouldn’t be done, one dwells bewildered and unprotected. One cannot 
righteously refer to oneself as a contemplative. This was my second righteous 
refutation of those priests and contemplative who hold to such teachings, such 
views.
14The Presocratic philosopher Parmenides had recognized this clearly early on. See also my 
personalist version of the tertia via of Thomas Aquinas, the proof of the existence of God from the 
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unfree causes in nature or in God explain the wonder of a free will in finite 
beings. Freedom in the world can come into being only from a free act of 
the absolute Being. Therefore, if God were not free, neither the contingent 
(non-necessarily existent) world nor free agents in it could exist. Therefore, 
to deny God’s freedom of choice while still admitting His existence will lead 
to some form of pantheism that dissolves human personhood and freedom.15 
Moreover, if the world, including evil flows necessarily from God, God would, 
if not freely, then necessarily, become the cause of evil as well. This is what 
Schelling suggests in his thesis that everything flows with absolute necessity 
(at least moral necessity) from God.16
3. Without divine freedom there would also be no divine holiness. Each adequate 
idea of God implies His freedom for another reason as well: as the condition 
and origin of His justice, mercy, and holiness, and as the highest perfection 
of any person qua person. Without God’s supremely perfect freedom the core 
of divine perfection would be null. God would no longer be just, merciful and 
holy, and hence not God.17
contingency of the world, in Seifert, Essere e persona ch.11.
15See Seifert, Essere e persona ch. 11.
16See Schelling 61:
… the proposition is utterly undeniable: that everything proceeds from the 
divine nature with absolute necessity, that everything that is possible by 
virtue of this nature must also be actual, and what is not actual also must be 
morally impossible.
This seems to deny any real creation and conceive of the world as well as of any evils in it as a 
direct and necessary consequence of divine nature, even though, in spite of expressing it, Schelling 
does not wish to draw this conclusion. See Schelling 63:
Hence, what comes from the mere condition or the ground, does not come 
from God, although it is necessary from his existence. But it cannot also be 
said that evil comes from the ground or that the will of the ground is the 
originator of evil. For evil can always only arise in the innermost will of our 
own heart and is never accomplished without our own act.
Schelling seeks to dissolve, but actually renders worse, in his deeply obscure text, this 
contradiction by a kind of dialectical identification of good and evil:
Hence it is entirely correct to say dialectically: good and evil are the same 
thing only seen from different sides… (63)
17Anselm of Canterbury, René Descartes and many other philosophers and theologians have 
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4. By denying divine, angelic and human freedom the entire Judeo-Chris-
tian revelation is denied and Holy Scripture rendered a worthless book. God 
would not be our creator, nor our redeemer, nor would there be divine for-
giveness of sins, nor any reason for gratitude towards God for our creation, 
redemption or for the forgiveness of our sins, because if these were not works 
of divine free choice, they would be nothing.
Likewise without the freedom of God, of angels and of humans all anthro-
pological content and teachings of Sacred Scripture and of the Church would 
lose their foundation: We would not be creatures but some moments in a nec-
essarily self-unfolding life of God. There would be no original sin, no personal 
sin, no redemption from them, no meaning of the divine commandments, nor 
of any divine promises. The Sermon on the Mount and the call to holiness 
would not have any sense any more let alone eternal rewards or punishments. 
All talk of a purgatory, of moral conscience, of the sacraments of confession 
and baptism or the unction of the sick would be senseless babbling.
In a word: without freedom there is no Christianity! There would also be 
no Judaism and no Islam, which recognize many of the same truths about 
God and man!
Therefore there is hardly any truth that is more important not only for 
the metaphysics of the person and our personal life, but also for the Christian 
and any other theistic faith than this one: that the person, whether human 
and finite or divine and infinite, is free.
But are we free? Do we possess freedom? And can we know this with our 
pure human reason or must we only accept this on faith? We need to distin-
guish two questions: (1) What is the essence of freedom? In what does it con-
sist (which we must understand not only in order to assert but also in order 
to deny human freedom)? And (2) Does freedom exist? The second question 
can again be divided into distinct questions: a) whether there is only human 
(and angelic) freedom, or b) there is only divine freedom, or c) both do, in fact, exist. 
In this article we shall, after a brief exposition on the nature of freedom, turn 
only to question (a), whether human freedom exists. Augustine and Descartes in-
sisted, along with contemporary authors such as Hans Eduard Hengstenberg, 
insisted on God’s possession of perfect freedom.
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on the absolute evidence of human freedom,18 but can we truly know that we 
are free? Before we can answer the question whether we are free and how we 
can know this, we have to inquire first into the nature of freedom.
18See Augustine’s discussion of Cicero’s objections against determinism and his insistence on 
freedom, in Augustine, De civitate Dei V, 9: 
Quod si ita, nihil est in nostra potestate nullumque est arbitrium voluntatis; 
quod si concedimus, inquit, omnis humana vita subvertitur, frustra 
leges dantur, frustra obiurgationes, laudes, vituperationes exhortationes 
adhibentur, neque ulla iustitia bonis praemia et malis supplicia constituta 
sunt. Haec ergo ne consequantur indigna et absurda et perniciosa rebus 
humanis, non vult esse praescientiam futurorum.
See also Aristotle: “For [man] is the lord over the being and over the non-being of his actions” 
(Eudemian Ethics, II.vi.8–9; 1223 a 3 ff.: “hoon ge kurios esti tou einai kai tou mee einai”). 
Aristotle could have hardly insisted more impressively on freedom than in this text but he also calls 
freedom in other passages “the first principle,” “the cause” and “the lord of action” (Nicomachean 
Ethics, 3rd Book; and Magna Moralia, 87 b 31 ff., especially 89 b 6 ff.).
See likewise Augustine : 
Item si quispiam dicat, errare nolo; nonne sive erret sive non erret, errare tamen 
eum nolle verum erit? Quis est qui huic non impudentissime dicat, Forsitan 
falleris? cum profecto ubicumque fallatur, falli se tamen nolle non fallitur. 
Et si hoc scire se dicat, addit quantum vult rerum numerum cognitarum, et 
numerum esse perspicit infinitum. Qui enim dicit, Nolo me falli et hoc me 
nolle scio, et hoc me scire scio; jam et si non commoda elocutione, potest hinc 
infinitum numerum ostendere. (De Trinitate XV, xii, 21)
Likewise if someone were to say: ‘I do not will to err,’ will it not be true that 
whether he errs or does not err, yet he does not will to err? Would it not be the 
height of impudence of anyone to say to this man: ‘Perhaps you are deceived,’ 
since no matter in what he may be deceived, he is certainly not deceived in not 
willing to be deceived? And if he says that he knows this, he adds as many known 
things as he pleases, and perceives it to be an infinite number. For he who says, 
‘I do not will to be deceived, and I know that I do not will this, and I know that I 
know this,’ can also continue from here towards an indefinite number, however 
awkward this manner of expressing it may be. (The Trinity 480–2)
See also Hengstenberg, Grundlegung der Ethik.
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2. A Few Notes on the Essence and Levels of Freedom
A. Freedom as an Irreducible Archdatum (Urphenomenon) that in spite of 
Its Indefinability Allows an Analysis and Unfolding of Its Essential Marks
Freedom is one of those arch-data that cannot be defined in terms of 
something else or reduced to anything besides itself. It includes, however, 
many dimensions and traits which can be unfolded and analyzed: It is not 
only a freedom from determining causes, an “I can but I do not need to,” but is 
also the power of self-determination that makes free acts utterly different from 
chance-events, with which Heisenberg and many physicists and philosophers 
of science confused it.19 Freedom also involves a special form of possession 
of one’s being, which is only possible in and through the free agent’s rational 
consciousness and capacity of self-governance and self-determination. To a 
person’s free determination and governance of herself corresponds also the 
person’s being governed and determined by herself.20
None of this can be understood if we do not recognize that free acts 
necessarily presuppose and entail consciousness. The term refers not only to 
immanent conscious states but to an intentional conscious directedness to 
something over against freedom. This something is an object of which we are 
conscious, to which we can refer in free acts only because we also are related to 
them through some rational knowledge and thought. Nothing is willed if it 
is not known before (nil volitum, nisi praecognitum), or, alternatively, nothing is 
willed that is not conceived in thought (nil volitum nisi cogitatum). This is how 
19Which, if they existed, would also not be determined from without. See the interesting 
discussion of many meanings of “chance” in Aristotle’s Physics. Also Peter van Inwagen holds that 
if determinism is false “then one’s acts are a result of chance.” During the V World Congress of 
Christian Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin Prof. Marek Piechowiak argued rightly 
that choosing between determinism or chance to explain human acts, and assuming that chance 
is the sole alternative to determinism if the latter be proven false, is not only logically incorrect 
(because there are other possibilities), but is also false precisely because free self-determination 
differs totally from chance in the sense of uncaused events. See also my “To Be a Person – To Be 
Free,” as well as “Wissen und Wahrheit.”
20See Wojtyìa, The Acting Person; cf. also the corrected text, authorized by the author 
(unpublished, official copy), at the Library of the International Academy of Philosophy in the 
Principality of Liechtenstein, Schibbogga 7 B-C, Bendern, Liechtenstein and IAP-PUC.
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one could formulate roughly the immensely differentiated relation between 
freedom and objects of consciousness. But the consciousness of some objects 
is not only presupposed by freedom, it characterizes free acts themselves: they 
relate consciously to their object.
Free acts, however, do not only presuppose some neutral objects such as 
the number of little pebbles on the street which can be objects of our percep-
tion or knowledge. Rather, free acts presuppose some good we aspire to or 
some evil we seek to avoid; otherwise freedom would sink down to the level 
of a totally sense-less exercise of changing neutral facts. We cannot meaning-
fully speak of a free act in an axiological void. In a meaningless and valueless 
universe free acts would not have any sensible motivation, and freedom itself 
would sink down to the level of pure empty arbitrariness. An example of the 
latter would be to say: “I am free to move pebble #2,000.019 from its position 
at the right of the adjacent pebble to its left.”
The object of a meaningful free act must therefore possess some impor-
tance that lifts it out of neutrality. This importance can be positive or negative. 
It can also take fundamentally different forms: it can move just on the level 
of the merely subjectively satisfying or dissatisfying. For example, pleasure 
is very often a desirable good but it can continue to motivate us even when 
such a satisfaction is neither objectively good for us but destructive nor good 
in itself. Thus we can consume drugs even if we know that they destroy our 
health, life, and happiness. The Good can also be an objective good for us, and 
lie in our true interest, which can happen even when we feel subjective dis-
satisfaction, as when we get freed from a drug-addiction. A being can also 
possess value in itself, an intrinsic preciousness calling upon an adequate 
response from us, such as when we say that the human person deserves re-
spect in view of her dignity.21
Freedom is thus not only a freedom from something and a self-determi-
nation or lordship over our own acts, but also a freedom for something, that is, 
the ability to speak a free “yes” or “no” to some object. The close connection 
between freedom and an object of which we are conscious and which possesses 
positive or negative importance entails the all-important power to engender 
from oneself acts by which one freely responds to and takes a stance on objects 
21See Hildebrand, Ethics ch. 1–3; 17–19.
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and other persons. This power also enables one to fulfill oughts and obliga-
tions issuing from the aforementioned objects in order to give them their due 
response; it gives one the capacity to serve goods and other persons,22 and 
provides one with the ability for self-donation.23 All these are aspects of the 
freedom for.
Freedom is also intimately connected with the life of the intellect and 
involves the capacity to open one’s mind in knowledge in order to receive in-
formation, to love the truth, to cooperate freely with the process of knowledge, 
and to consent to some extent freely to that which is known to us.24
b. two dimensions of Human Freedom and Morality
In order to understand the relation between freedom and the different 
kinds of acts which it renders possible, we must first distinguish two quite 
different dimensions or perfections of freedom.25 The first one unfolds in rela-
tion to the important object; it involves a free “yes” or a free “no” spoken to 
it. It is the freedom to respond, to take a stance, to affirm or reject an object 
or state of affairs.
The second dimension of freedom consists in the will’s ability to engender 
free outward-directed actions and to initiate new causal chains. This is how 
the will becomes the lord over our external actions and manifests the ability 
to initiate activities which might then lead to the external realization of states 
of affairs after “affirming” (willing) them freely in an inner response. The 
second dimension of freedom may also lead to the creation of objects, works 
of art, etc., which are not reducible to states of affairs.
The first perfection of free will is deeper and has a much wider scope than 
the second. It encompasses as well all purely inner responses, including those 
22See Desmond.
23On the concept of self-donation see especially Wojtyìa, Liebe und Verantwortung and 
Hildebrand, Das Wesen der Liebe ch. 1–7, 9, 11. See also the papers of Szostek and Fedoryka in 
Freedom in Contemporary Culture.
24See the excellent work of De Marchi, Etica dell’assenso. See on this also the idea of real 
assent in Newman, The Grammar of Assent, as well as the notion of “freie Anerkennung” in 
Styczeî's paper in Freedom in Contemporary Culture. 
25See Hildebrand, Ethics ch. 20 ff.
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directed to objects which the free agent can in no way change,26 such as God. 
Another example would be a neighbor who is perhaps a more gifted person 
than we are, whom we can freely respect and affirm in love, or reject in hate 
and envy.27 Still another example is a “cross” or an illness, which we cannot 
alter but can freely and humbly accept or rebel against.
The second dimension of human freedom chiefly refers to free actions in 
the strict sense, i.e., to acts which aim at the realization of things that are not 
yet real but can be realized through me. Within the things that can be brought 
into being by free acts we distinguish the object-sphere of acting (prattein) from 
the object-sphere of making (poiein). Acting must be understood in the narrower 
sense of this term, as that through which we bring about states of affairs, such as 
saving the life of a person who fell into deep water and could not swim. Mak-
ing, on the other hand, is that through which we can produce palpable things 
such as handiwork or works of art. In such actions or creative acts which are 
geared to the real world outside of ourselves, we initiate those activities which 
bring about the intended states of affairs or objects of making.
Both dimensions of freedom involve the mysterious inner power to engen-
der acts without any preceding cause, and without our nature forcing us to 
act. This essence of freedom is common to all free acts and actions and entails 
an absolutely astonishing feature: due to our freedom we are “the lords over 
the being and the non-being of our act[ion]s.”28 
26Hildebrand, in his Ethics, failed to see clearly the independence of this first perfection 
of human freedom from the second, and the central and all-encompassing role of free responses 
not only with respect to non-realized states of affairs that can be realized through me, but with 
respect to all kinds of morally relevant goods. Cf. Seifert, Was ist und was motiviert eine sittliche 
Handlung? In his later work, Hildebrand corrected this mistake of his Ethics (see Moralia).
27We do not refer here to the affective response of love, envy or hatred, which we cannot freely 
engender. But there is also a free affirmation of the person as a whole which we can call a volitional 
dimension or form of love. The full reality of love requires both the free response to the person and 
the affective response of love, which in turn can be sanctioned by the free will.
28Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics II.vi.8–9; 1223 a 3 ff.: “hoon ge kurios esti tou einai kai 
tou mee einai” (“and he is lord of their [his actions’] being and non-being”). See also Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, III; and Magna Moralia, 87 b 31 ff., especially 89 b 6 ff. Aristotle could 
hardly be more explicit on freedom as he is in these texts, calling the free agent first principle, 
cause, lord, master of the action.
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The first perfection of the responding will freely affirms a good without 
necessarily choosing properly, since it also includes the freedom of choice. 
Free choice, at least in finite persons, is not restricted to choosing the proper 
means to achieve the good as final end: a free person does not necessarily 
want as final end the intrinsic good or the happy life or the realization of moral 
values; the free person thus does not necessarily choose the adequate response 
to the truth and to morally relevant goods. Instead, the free person can fail 
to will the first and most important objective goal of freedom – to conform 
one’s life to the truth and to true goods. One can instead choose a life of sub-
jective satisfaction indifferent to intrinsic values and morally relevant goods, 
and even indifferent to one’s own objective good. Thus a free finite person 
can choose between ultimate ends, between good and evil, between the love 
of God that has as its highest form the abandonment of self (amor Dei usque 
ad contemptum sui) and the self-love and lust for pleasure that has as its lowest 
form the contempt for God (amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei).29 This choice 
between the ultimate ends is the chief drama of human freedom.
29Augustine, De civitate Dei 14, 28:
Fecerunt itaque ciuitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque 
ad contemptum Dei, caelestem uero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. 
denique illa in se ipsa, haec in Domino gloriatur.
After this text, Augustine further unfolds the meaning and nature of these two loves:
Illa enim quaerit ab hominibus gloriam; huic autem Deus conscientiae testis 
maxima est gloria. illa in gloria sua exaltat caput suum; haec dicit Deo suo: 
‘Gloria mea et exaltans caput meum.’ illi in principibus eius uel in eis quas 
subiugat nationibus dominandi libido dominatur; in hac seruiunt inuicem 
in caritate et praepositi consulendo et subditi obtemperando. Illa in suis 
potentibus diligit uirtutem suam; haec dicit Deo suo: ‘diligam te, Domine, 
uirtus mea.’ Ideoque in illa sapientes eius secundum hominem uiuentes aut 
corporis aut animi sui bona aut utriusque sectati sunt, aut qui potuerunt 
cognoscere Deum, ‘non ut Deum honorauerunt aut gratias egerunt, sed 
euanuerunt in cogitationibus suis, et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum; 
dicentes se esse sapientes’ (id est dominante sibi superbia in sua sapientia sese 
extollentes) ‘stulti facti sunt et inmutauerunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in 
similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et uolucrum et quadrupedum et 
serpentium’ (ad huiusce modi enim simulacra adoranda uel duces populorum 
uel sectatores fuerunt), ‘et coluerunt atque seruierunt creaturae potius quam 
Creatori, qui est benedictus in saecula’; in hac autem nulla est hominis 
sapientia nisi pietas, qua recte colitur uerus Deus, id expectans praemium 
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Besides such actual free responses, which one experiences here and now 
and direct to an object, there are also superactual free responses in a person. 
These continue to exist in us even when we do not actually experience them 
or think of them. As we know many things superactually even when we do not 
think of them, so we find also that concretely lived free acts and responses do 
not exhaust themselves in our actually experiencing them. Both our responses 
to individual beings (such as our love for our wife or child) and to general 
types and whole spheres of value, such as attitudes of reverence, the virtues of 
justice, of purity, etc., can persist in the form of superactual acts. They manifest 
themselves in our emotions, feelings, concrete responses and actions, etc. All 
virtues and vices are superactual acts. They profoundly influence the concrete 
actual consciousness of a person and are as it were a basso continuo which ac-
companies the actual melodies of our daily life.
Finally, there is the so-called fundamental moral option for or against all 
morally relevant goods, for or against God and the whole world of values. This 
response has the most universal scope of objects. If it gains sturdy roots in a 
person, it goes beyond being an “option,” it becomes the most fundamental 
moral attitude; this attitude may also be called the general moral attitude.30 
in societate sanctorum non solum hominum, uerum etiam angelorum, ‘ut sit 
Deus omnia in omnibus.’
30This most general attitude, however, is not called so because in itself it would be an abstract 
entity, but it is ‘general’ in at least three distinct ways: (1) It is really or potentially present in all 
other morally good or evil acts; and (2) it has the most general morally relevant good as its object: 
both in the sense of all morally relevant goods to which it responds and the supremely concrete 
and yet all-encompassing good: God. Moreover, (3) it is called to become superactually real in the 
person and thus receives the character of a lasting foundation for a person’s moral life, which is a 
condition for fulfilling its character of underlying the entirety of a person’s individual responses 
and moral acts.
Certainly, the general moral response to the world of morally relevant goods can also exist in 
us merely momentarily as a stance we take at a certain moment towards the whole world of values. 
But it is intended to achieve a superactual reality in our soul and deserves the name attitude 
(rather than momentary stance) only when it has become superactual. It also can and should have 
a special depth in different senses, and not only in that of the superactual life of the person: It can 
be more or less firmly rooted in the person, it can qualitatively be more or less deep, play a greater 
or lesser role in our lives, last longer or shorter in its identity throughout time, as opposed to 
fast-changing attitudes, etc. The fundamental moral attitude, inasmuch as it is freely sanctioned, 
constitutes in a sense the backbone of our moral life, and is the fountain of concrete actions. Being 
also strengthened and formed by them, it possesses utmost significance in any adequate philosophy 
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of virtue and ethics. It must not be regarded as unconscious, however, though it is more hidden to 
our reflection than concrete intentions.
The notion of fundamental moral option, apart from being interpreted in many false 
transcendental idealist senses as unconscious, free of content, formal, never experienced, etc., 
is today also frequently divorced from an understanding of its foundational role for the sphere of 
action. We avoid this term for the fundamental moral attitude chiefly because of this “teleological” 
(consequentialist) misunderstanding. Furthermore, this term refers only to one of the elements 
related to the fundamental moral attitude, which Hildebrand called “the fundamental moral 
intention.” It is not possible here to distinguish all these elements and acts. See Sittlichkeit und 
ethische Wert er kennt nis. The fundamental moral attitude (option) does have both a content and 
an object. Its content can be extremely “thin” and formal, such as when the good general moral 
attitude of an atheist or skeptic has only the form of not wanting to do anything that is in truth 
forbidden her, and if she is ready to obey all moral obligations (if they exist and she has knowledge 
of them), submitting in this formal and abstract way to the truth (while leaving open the content 
and knowability of truth and feeling unsure whether perhaps in truth everything is permitted). Yet 
the will to submit to truth in thought and action remains always a decisive element of the person’s 
fundamental morally good attitude. For all moral imperatives bind in the name of truth, and 
judgments which make a claim to truth are presupposed everywhere in our moral life. And nothing 
is permitted except if it is in truth permitted.
The good fundamental moral attitude may take on much more content, however. It may be 
based on a clear recognition of the truth and its basic contents and refer specifically to morally 
relevant goods which are understood to exist. It may thus take the essentially different form of a 
clear general will to respond adequately to the morally relevant goods and also as the general will 
to be morally good.
This general will to be good constitutes a new and very important element of the fundamental 
moral attitude which is another value-responding attitude towards the unique and specifically 
moral value that one has to realize. The fundamental moral attitude as the “general will to be 
good” refers to the bonum est faciendum in the sense of the sphere of moral values and disvalues 
in the person herself. Scheler thought that the acceptance of the call to realize moral values in our 
own person was impossible or at least involves pharisaism. To be interested in one’s own moral 
goodness is, according to him, to fail to accept the principle that the moral value “rides on the back 
of my actions.” It would be a self-centered attitude and involve a turning away from the morally 
relevant object of the good of our neighbor. This however is not exact, although it is true that the 
genuine interest in the other’s good, in the morally relevant good, is indeed a condition of authentic 
morality. A careful phenomenology of the fundamental moral attitude forces us to recognize a 
two-fold directedness of the Grundhaltung—to all morally relevant goods and to the realization of 
moral values in us.
It would not be objective to not want to be good ourselves if it is recognized that moral values 
are higher than even all morally relevant ones which are not moral values in themselves.
We recognize here first of all the fact that moral values are morally relevant values as well, 
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whether they exist in us or in other persons. Parents have to be interested, and primarily so, in the 
moral goodness of their children. Socrates is committed to further the moral virtue of his fellow-
citizens. To show disinterest in the moral goodness in others is such a bad attitude that it becomes 
questionable whether any moral goodness can be present in a person who fails to give this response.
But if we respond to moral values, we should respond to them in all subjects and in all their 
forms which we recognize as such. But as it would be morally wrong to be disinterested in moral 
values as such, it would be most illogical not to be interested in their realization in us. That this 
interest as such has nothing to do with pharisaism or egocentricity in morality is seen when we 
understand that the general response to moral values in us and in others must be, first of all, a 
value-response, and not just a response to the objective good for us, i.e., in order to be “saved” or 
to attain the highest happiness and objective good for us. The general response to moral values 
is, first of all, a value response which falls into the second kind of general morally good response 
to all morally relevant goods, among which moral values occupy the first place. The deeper one 
understands and responds to the essence of moral goodness (as embodied in God, as participation 
in his goodness, in its supernatural essence, as glorification of God), the more pure and sublime 
the general moral attitude becomes.
Thus it would be illogical in the highest degree not to be interested in our own moral goodness 
as if that were any less important than the moral values in others. We must distinguish the 
egocentric or pharisaic interest “only in our salvation” or even in the purely subjectively satisfying 
aspect of glorifying ourselves and of enjoying our superiority from our value-response to moral 
values. Only the latter is pharisaism while the form is an integral part of the fundamental good 
moral attitude.
But in the “general will to be good” we find a second and radically new moment, namely the 
awareness that we cannot realize moral values primarily in the world or in other persons but only 
in ourselves. We only have this kind of control over ourselves, which permits us to realize them 
directly. Therefore the general “will to be good” refers not to the moral goodness of others but to our 
own. It also accepts the kind of irreplaceable character of our own person and the primary way 
in which their call is directed to our own self, in the sense of a special absoluteness of the moral 
obligations being addressed to us that forbids us ever to say that “we should commit a moral evil so 
that another can avoid an even greater one.” Such a moral weighing of goods is excluded from this 
self-directedness of the “general will to be good” which recognizes the unique irreplaceable “Tua 
res agitur” in the moral imperative.
Additionally, saying that this will to be good has to have a value-responding character does 
not preclude that it may involve an interest in our own (or anybody else’s) objective good for the 
person. On the contrary, the objective good for persons including our own constitutes a dimension 
of morally relevant goods that must be responded to in order for our attitude to be truly morally 
good. It is more problematic to determine whether a general moral attitude would still be good if 
we were interested only in our own salvation and if the will to be morally good did not include any 
response to the intrinsic value of morality. Imagine that someone were to say, for example, “I do not 
care a bit for moral goodness as such but I know that I shall be damned if I am not good. Therefore, 
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and therefore alone (to win my salvation and to avoid punishment), I shall be good. Otherwise I 
would not give a damn for justice and goodness.” Can this still be morally good? It appears to be so 
only in the most rudimentary way, and even here only by involving a certain unconscious response 
to the value of one’s own person and possibly even to moral goodness because of its intrinsic value. 
If someone is not at least implicitly motivated by the inherent worth of moral values but excludes 
this in the form of a radical disinterest or even hatred for them, the interest in his own objective 
good is either not even possible any longer or – if it were possible – is deprived of any moral value. 
One could express this in terms of the traditional distinction in theology between repentance out 
of love and out of fear. A repentance motivated by fear but not rejecting all love is imperfect. A 
repentance out of fear with the total exclusion of any love seems to be not only imperfect but is 
tantamount to no repentance at all. 
This leads us to a further insight into the true nature of the fundamental moral attitude: 
it ought to preserve the hierarchy within the motives of moral acts, as well as the hierarchical 
relationship between morally relevant goods and moral values, with the intention of realizing 
justice and other morally good acts primarily because of their intrinsic moral goodness.
The element of the fundamental moral attitude directed to all morally relevant goods and 
moral obligations differs from the more general commitment to truth in being more concrete since 
it is based on the recognition that there are some morally obligatory and morally relevant things 
besides “whatever truly binds us.” It concretizes the Grundhaltung towards truth by going one step 
further beyond the moral relevance of truth and by recognizing some other morally relevant goods.
We could further distinguish the morally required and obligatory Grundhaltung to submit 
to all morally obligatory goods, and the “optional” Grundhaltung which lies in the further 
determination to follow moral invitations. Strictly speaking, the fundamental moral intention 
to respect all morally obligatory goods and to acquire this Grundhaltung is obligatory, but since 
the general superactual attitude is not within our direct free power (but only the indirect one), it 
cannot directly be morally obligatory to have it.
Moral obligations are born in the encounter of subject and morally relevant object and arise 
in two ways. They can start with a “moral invitation” to perform free sacrifices or heroic acts, 
such as Maximilian Kolbe’s sacrifice of his life for another family’s father. They can also arise in 
a moment of absoluteness and make a direct appeal to our conscience, which is evident in cases 
where the same morally relevant good (a human life) is at stake without any obligation for us who 
enter the picture. An example is when we see human persons as shoppers in a supermarket, where 
their lives do not impose special or actual moral obligations on us. The universality of the object of 
the fundamental moral attitude reveals itself in the response to all obligations, as new moments 
compared to the morally relevant goods (for example a human person or life). This moral obligation 
and law requires a new and unconditional respect (Achtung), and possesses a new absoluteness 
that calls quite logically for a new moment of obedience in the fundamental moral attitude. This 
element within the fundamental moral attitude is not explicable through the commitment to 
objective goods, such as human life, that are morally relevant but do not deserve in themselves 
this absolute subordination and obedience owed to the moral obligation. See my Was ist und 
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was motiviert eine sittliche Handlung? Inasmuch as the objective moral obligations are always 
mediated through our knowledge and conscience, and bind us in this form of being recognized 
and acknowledged by the subject, one could also describe the fundamental moral attitude as the 
determination to always follow one’s conscience.
Additionally, the fundamental openness to non-obligatory moral calls can exist on many 
levels of qualitative depth and purity: a) it can exist to some more or less limited degree as with 
most morally good human persons; b) it can also exist in the form of a heroic and in a certain sense 
unlimited morally good attitude to respond as far as possible not only to all morally obligatory 
goods but also to all non-obligatory goods, and indeed to choose the more perfect goods before 
the lower ones. Such an “unlimitedly morally good attitude” towards non-obligatory goods we find 
in St. Theresa of Avila who reports in her Life of having vowed to do always that which appeared 
to her was morally more perfect.
The fundamental moral attitude can be differentiated also according to the underlying ethical 
knowledge (the purity and depth of ethical knowledge, its closeness to the moral data, etc.) as well 
as in accordance with the different degrees of the depth of the will and the volitional affirmation 
of the morally relevant goods. There are also many degrees of moral consciousness informing and 
characterizing the fundamental moral attitude. Its scope is still universal but with each specific 
understanding of concrete morally relevant goods it becomes more conscious and is enriched and 
expanded with respect to its content and object.
If a person accepts the existence of God as an infinite personal being most worthy of love (as 
an id quo maius nihil cogitari possit), the good fundamental moral attitude may assume much 
more content still and exist in the form of the unambiguous love of God and love of neighbor. When 
one accepts the truth about the world and God revealed by Christ, a completely new quality of 
the fundamental moral attitude and of the virtues informed by caritas comes to exist. (See the 
phenomenological analyses of Hildebrand in his Transformation in Christ, and in Ethics, as well 
as in Das Wesen der Liebe ch. 11.)
The fundamental moral attitude is also one of obedience and of surrender to God. Socrates 
already expressed this by saying in the Apology: “I respect you, Athenians, but I have to obey God 
more than you.” This obedience to God constitutes a new personal reference point discovered quite 
naturally in the very nature of the moral ought but much more clearly present and grasped when 
the existence of God is known and consciously responded to.
See “For I am the LORD your God: ye shall therefore sanctify yourselves, and ye shall be holy; 
for I am holy” (Lev. 11:44). See also Lev. 11:45; 19:2; 20:26; 21:8, and also 1 Peter 1:16: “Because it 
is written, Be ye holy; for I am holy.” The reference to the absolute divine personal being is not only 
found in the Bible but discovered in other essential marks of morality: in responsibility, punishment, 
etc. Newman thought in his Grammar of Assent that this datum prior to all religion is the “creative 
principle of all religion.” So much did he recognize that it precedes all positive religion.
There are countless degrees and forms of this fundamental moral attitude directed to God: 
the obedience to God, the desire that His will be done, the solemn affirmation of his holiness in 
adoration, etc. The climax of this gesture in the general morally good attitude lies in the explicit 
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religious acts of loving and glorifying God.
Is an atheistic morally good attitude therefore possible? I would think so. An atheist can very 
well have the general morally good attitude related to truth: “If truth exists, I will accept it; if God 
exists, I will glorify him.” But the good general attitude of the atheist is morally good only if the 
atheist is open in principle, i.e., if God does exist and were known to him, to this motivating 
ground of morality. If the atheist rejected explicitly and in principle God (even if he were to 
find that He exists) or if he were to set up his moral goodness against God, all his acts would lose 
any moral value for the reason of embodying diabolical pride and revolt against God. Any moral 
attitude that says, “if there were a God, how could I stand not to be one? Therefore there is no 
God” could only be evil. But on the other hand, the fundamental morally good attitude towards 
truth and the good might even demand atheism, not objectively but subjectively, if someone had 
an image of God according to which God, if He corresponded to this image, truly deserves to be 
rejected in the name of an eternal moral order and in the name of evident moral values. Such a 
conception of God which would justify the rejection of God includes the widespread deterministic 
image of a God who would condemn angels and men to eternal punishment for their sins although 
these sins and the fact that they do evil would solely depend on God’s own will against whose decree 
the creatures could in no way act. An acceptance of such a God would be morally evil, at least if 
one understands properly what one believes in such a determinist interpretation of sin and hell. 
Therefore, it is a moral demand to reject such a God who corresponds to this false image. It is also 
clear that when we presuppose the objective goodness of God this moment of the morally good 
attitude, the response to God, differs very much depending on the vagueness or clarity of someone’s 
metaphysical conception of God. This element of the morally good attitude towards God stretches 
from a vague “openness to God” (as even the atheist or agnostic can possess) to the fervent and 
unconditioned love of God.
Many authors thought that the fundamental morally good attitude is restricted to a very 
formal abstract level, or even is a-thematic in the sense of it having no object at all. This is the 
“transcendental” conception of the “ fundamental option” found in Karl Rahner and other authors 
and is, in my opinion, in contradiction to the nature of intentional consciousness which must have 
an object, reducing the fundamental option to an irrational state of consciousness. Of course, 
if a-thematic were to mean the superactual character of this attitude which continues to exist 
even when I do not actually perform and live it, it would be quite correct to attribute this to 
the fundamental moral attitude. If the term meant that this attitude can never be actualized 
in consciousness, it would again be a false assertion because all superactual attitudes can and 
should become actually conscious from time to time. The same would apply to the thesis that 
the fundamental moral attitude can never become the theme or object of reflection. Superactual 
realities differ wholly from the sphere of the subconscious. See the discussion of the superactuality 
of virtues in Hildebrand’s Ethics.
In reality, as we now easily see, it can have very rich and concrete objects, embracing them 
all and branching off into the different concrete virtues which respond to single spheres of morally 
relevant goods such as rights (justice) or property (honesty), or the dignity and “sacredness” of 
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C. Cooperative Freedom and the Gift of self as supreme Fulfillment of 
Persons
It is clear that we cannot directly realize superactual attitudes and virtues 
by a simple fiat. We can freely engender general moral intentions, but they 
neither immediately take root in the person nor acquire instantaneously the 
personal depth proper to superactual virtues. Similarly, we cannot, by a simple 
fiat of our will, bring about affective responses such as grief, or love, or joy, or 
compassion, or repentance, however appropriate these spiritual affections are 
to their objects.31 Yet this does not imply that we have no freedom or respon-
sibility with respect to our superactual attitudes or to these spiritual affective 
responses. We come to recognize here two further important manifestations 
of freedom: (1) the indirect role of our free acts, and (2) cooperative freedom.
(1) A single free action of helping someone lies within the power of our 
immediate freedom (in spite of the difficulties and limitations we may experi-
ence with respect to its actualization), and has an immediate and direct effect 
the body and human sexuality (chastity and purity), and giving rise to responses to still more 
individual goods. Also the morally good attitude towards God is, if we understand God as supreme 
embodiment of all pure perfections, directed to an extremely concrete and living reality, the 
archetype of all individual thisness and qualitative concreteness as the perfect justice, love, 
goodness, wisdom, and all-encompassing perfection. 
 In order to receive its full meaning, the general free moral attitude must also exist superactually, 
i.e., to say its reality in us cannot be restricted to the times when we consciously live it, think of it. This 
attitude is not meant to endure merely a few moments but to become a lasting and formative basis of 
our moral life. A person’s rational life, his knowing and willing, can extend far beyond the limits of the 
moment and of the short islands of the present. It can last, without being subconscious. The superactual 
attitudes are rather supraconscious and constitute the background and form of conscious human 
life. Not all human experiences allow for such a superactual existence. But many experiences, such 
as “knowing some object” and “knowing that” (which refers to states of affairs), or loving, exist only 
if they are superactual and not restricted to short islands of time. Both general moral attitudes and 
responses to individual persons, such as the love for a child or spouse, can be superactual.
Thus, starting from the most general fundamental moral option for or against the morally 
relevant goods as such, for or against God, for or against truth, the life and formative influence 
of superactual free acts extend to concrete attitudes towards individual persons. Our moral life 
is deeply formed by such superactual responses and attitudes. Such attitudes can also open our 
intellect and contribute much to our value-perception or lead to value-blindness. Thus they exert 
an enormous influence on our moral life. For all of this, see the important work of Hildebrand, 
Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis.
31On the spiritual forms of affectivity see Hildebrand, The Sacred Heart/Über das Herz. 
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in the world and on our conscious life. Yet each action has also indirect effects 
on ourselves; it will influence and gradually change our superactual attitudes 
and the kind of emotional responses (love or hatred, warmth or envy and bit-
terness) we give to others. This applies to good as well as to bad actions.32 Thus 
we come to understand that our freedom has an enormous indirect influence 
distinct from the direct freedom by which we bring about free acts.
(2) Even more amazing is what we might term “cooperative freedom.”33 
We cannot directly bring about with our free fiat attitudes towards persons 
or values that result indirectly from many free actions. We cannot, likewise, 
immediately evoke affective responses of repentance, compassion, or love; 
they often arise in our nature without us choosing them, and they neverthe-
less can be, morally and humanly speaking, adequate or inadequate to their 
human or divine object. Now the fact that all of these acts and feelings do 
not obey our immediate free command does not preclude the fact that they 
are in many ways influenced indirectly by our free acts. Thus the free acts of 
repeated adultery will give rise to an impure and unfaithful attitude and to 
kinds of feelings towards one’s wife and other women that a faithful husband 
will not himself experience.
Besides the indirect freedom that exerts a great influence on such data 
of the moral life as virtues and vices and affections, we also have another im-
portant capacity: cooperative freedom. The latter refers to our relating freely 
and in a particularly intimate way to those realities within us that arise with-
out freedom. We can conspire freely with the tears of repentance that arise 
in us, or suppress them; we can freely disavow feelings of hatred or identify 
ourselves with them. We can cooperate with emotions of love and form them 
freely from within by sanctioning them. We are touching here upon that which 
constitutes the very heart of human freedom. The recognition of cooperative 
freedom even modifies what we have said about freedom at the beginning of 
this paper, namely, the description of freedom in terms of our being “the lords 
32There are many other forms of the indirect influence of our freedom. When we meditate 
on our lives, for example, instead of acting thoughtlessly and without the necessary reflection, 
we will influence our lives indirectly. Yet this act of meditation itself we can command, we can 
take time to think about the purpose of our lives or hunt from pleasure to pleasure, from noise 
to noise and divert ourselves in the negative sense described by Pascal (136). See also Seifert, 
Schachphilosophie 90–105.
33See Hildebrand, Ethics ch. 25, “Cooperative Freedom.”
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over the being and the non-being of our acts.” This characterization of freedom 
in terms of autonomy does not adequately describe many other aspects such 
as the freedom manifested in the grateful receiving of gifts, in gratitude as 
such, and in cooperative freedom.34
In many cases, the highest of which involve divine grace, we find in our 
soul gifts and experiences of joy or love which arise in us but are not products 
of our freedom. Yet inasmuch as such movements of our soul are adequate 
or inadequate to their object, good or bad, we must not let them arise in us 
without the involvement of our freedom. When these movements are bad, we 
ought to disavow them, thereby not immediately eradicating them but “de-
capitating” them, as it were. We can freely say “no” to our feeling of intense 
envy, when we realize its evilness and inappropriateness. This is not an act of 
repression but, on the contrary, an act of conscious confrontation with one’s 
self. By disavowing feelings of envy, the person disassociates herself from 
them. Thus they become movements of the soul for which we are no longer 
responsible in the way in which we are responsible when we let envy grow in 
us without taking such a free stance.
Much more profound is the interpenetration of freedom and positive af-
fective responses, or other non-free experiences and gifts in us. When a deep 
love or feeling of repentance is granted to us – a feeling or movement of our 
soul which we never could have given to ourselves – our freedom is not fated 
to remain outside such gifts. It can join in with the gift. We can freely sanction 
our affective response or an attitude of our will so that we are able to provide 
what is due an object or a person, and recognize that it has the character of 
a gift and therefore does not stand simply within our power. By such a free 
sanctioning of these acts, we integrate them into our free life. Analogously, we 
can appropriate and accept into our freedom all intentional and good acts 
which arise in our soul, including our acceptance and conviction of the truth. 
Furthermore, we can, in the sphere of the intellect, integrate by a free sanction 
and affirm from within convictions that arise organically and on their own 
from our cognition. Given the rationality of the conviction and its character 
34See Desmond’s paper in Freedom in Contemporary Culture. See also Schwarz, “Über 
die Dankbarkeit”/“Del agradecimiento”; “Der Dank als Gesinnung und Tat”; “Some Reflections 
on Gratitude”; “Réflexions sur la gratitude et l’admiration” (also ibid., 242–248, Diskussion); 
Dankbarkeit ist das Gedächtnis des Herzens.
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as a theoretical and adequate response to reality (or states of affairs), we can 
also sanction it or add to convictions resulting simply from knowledge (being 
convinced by the object known) others that have the character of free real assent.35 
We can speak a free “yes” to truth, a response which takes on a new role when 
it is not merely based on evident knowledge but on probable knowledge, or 
on faith.36 We can turn that which is given to us as a gift into a free act, by 
freely sanctioning such gifts. Gift and freedom interpenetrate each other here. 
We might speak37 of a spiritual wedding of our will with our affections38 and 
with other noble movements or acts in us, including the assent to truth. By 
affections which well up in us as gifts, such as deep emotions of love, our will 
is enriched and allowed to partake as it were in the wealth of those affections 
and of other movements of the soul which possess the character of a gift. Thus 
the deepest dimensions of freedom do not actualize themselves simply by the 
free center of the person alone. They are not even solely formed by, as well as 
dependent upon, the value of the object which gives purpose and meaning 
to our freedom. 
Rather, the deepest dimension of human freedom requires a gift which 
precedes it and a cooperation with such a gift through which freedom can 
attain its supreme dignity.39 This is true in a special way of the deepest act of 
freedom realized only in love and in the gift of Self, in which we give to the 
other not only a response or a something in ourselves, do not only perform acts, 
but give our very self to the other. This self-donation in love requires in its full-
ness in the human level the gift of the affective response to the beloved person 
which we cannot produce ourselves but only sanction with our free will. 
In this ultimate sense, then, “to be free” means to cooperate with gifts 
on the natural (and, as the Christian believes, also the supernatural) order. 
Without using our freedom in cooperation with such gifts we can never attain 
35This played a great role in the Stoic philosophy of judgment.
36Hildebrand did not discuss the role of freedom in theoretical responses such as convictions, 
which he regarded as not free in his Ethics ch. 17.
37See Hildebrand, Ethics 316–37.
38See Laun, Die mitwirkende Freiheit; Fragen der Moraltheologie heute; and Der 
salesianische Liebesbegriff 91ff.
39While this is a purely philosophical distinction based on the data of affective experiences, 
it is clear that this is of the highest importance for an understanding of the Catholic theological 
teaching on justification.
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the highest perfection to which the person is called nor fulfill what it means 
“to be a person.”40
d. Which of the three Levels of Freedom belongs Essentially to the Person?
We have already said that on purely philosophical grounds freedom in-
separably belongs to personhood. Now we have to make some fundamental 
distinctions within what we call freedom, namely between: 1) freedom as a 
faculty (power) inseparable from personhood; 2) freedom as an ability here 
and now to perform free acts; and 3) freedom as the activation of this ability 
in actually performing free acts. Only the latter two imply the conscious life, 
the self-determination and other traits of freedom mentioned above. The fac-
ulty of freedom or the free will (sense 1) belongs substantially to the person 
qua person and exists in every person. This is not true of freedom in senses 
(2) and (3). Certainly, the faculty of freedom is also ordained to be exercised 
in conscious actualization. This is the only time we can encounter and expe-
rience freedom, as well as gain the metaphysical insight into its bearer, the 
person, and into the existence of the free power and of free potentialities which 
must exist prior to their actualizations in free acts. On the other hand, and 
equally certainly, neither the actual ability to perform free acts nor the actual use of 
it in these acts themselves is inseparable from personhood. They are not found 
in embryos and new-born babies, unconscious or comatose patients and in 
persons afflicted by certain types of grave mental retardation or psychic com-
pulsion, and are absent in all human beings during sleep. But to be a person 
entails the fundamental metaphysical faculty, a capacity in principle to perform 
free acts.41 As faculty, freedom resides on the level of the substantial being of 
40This fact, which is evident on the level of affective experiences and general attitudes and 
convictions, is much more evident on the level of Christian faith where we understand the supreme 
act of freedom to lie in a free acceptance of and cooperation with divine grace. Faith is a free act 
of “ faith in” and submission to God, and a consequent “belief that” what He reveals to us is true. 
Even more profoundly, the supernatural love of caritas, without which we cannot speak a “Totus 
Tuus,” requires the gift of grace.
41See Augustine, The City of God V, 8–11, especially V, 9; Kierkegaard VII, I, 141. See also a 
similar idea in Descartes, Principia Philosophiae I, 40 ff. See also Wojtyìa, The Acting Person. 
Free acts in finite persons require of course the action of the infinite divine being. See Seifert, Leib 
und Seele.
The notion of faculties (powers) was very well developed by the scholastic philosophers, 
especially by Thomas Aquinas. See also Crosby. On the notion of the substantial being of the person 
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the person or, more precisely, is inseparable from the substantial spiritual 
being of the person.
3. but Are we actually Free? do we indeed Possess this Marvelous 
Quality? Knowing the Existence of Human Freedom
In our discussion of the essence of freedom we already presupposed all 
along, and as we shall see with good reason, that we as human persons are 
free. We spoke of us being able to take free stances, to command actions, to 
cooperate, etc. Nevertheless, we must distinguish sharply between know-
ing the essence of freedom and knowing the existence of human freedom. 
In principle, to gain an insight into all we saw about the essence of freedom 
does not yet imply that we actually are free, that freedom actually exists in the 
human being, either in actu or in potencia, as fundamental faculty of the person. 
We can understand full well the fundamental difference between grasping 
the essence of freedom and knowing the existence of human freedom. This is 
evident because the determinist who denies the existence of human freedom 
need sto understand as well the essence of that which he denies. Can we then 
know that human freedom exists and that we actually are free?
If human freedom did not exist, human beings would not be persons, as we 
had already seen – but why should this be impossible? Maybe humans are not 
persons, as those countless philosophies that deny human freedom imply.
That it is one of the innumerable “eternal truths”42 that “person and free-
dom are inseparable,” still leaves the question unanswered: Does freedom ex-
ist in man? All the facts about the essence of freedom and personhood say nothing 
yet about human beings actually possessing this astonishing faculty.43
cf. also my Essere e persona ch. ix 8–9.
42See Augustine, De libero arbitrio II, or in his famous Quaestio “De Ideis” (contained in the 
83 Questions on Diverse Subjects).
43Even less does it follow from the essential bond between freedom and personhood that 
human freedom would have to exist in actu all the time or that it excludes many dependencies 
on conditions, situations, etc. Human freedom, even if it does exist as a fundamental faculty or 
power of the person, does not exclude either those certain external and irrational moments of 
action (for example the question at which exact time we decide to go to town, etc.) that may be due 
to unconscious causes such as commands given to a person under hypnosis, or some disease.
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Is it not a prerogative of God to be Lord over the being and the non-being 
of a thing by a simple inner word or fiat, without the person being determined 
to such a fiat by any cause other than his or her own free center? 
Is there then such a god-like quality in any finite person as to be the lord 
over the being and non-being of her acts? Answering this question affirma-
tively, as we implicitly did, obliges us to answer also how we can know that 
we are free. I will point out in the following five ways how in fact we know 
that we are free:
A. A First response: the Immediate Evidence of Freedom in the Cogito
The first answer to our question imposes itself on us: the god-like attri-
bute of the free human person, “for if we will, it is; if we will not, it is not,” as 
Augustine says, is something we experience in consciously living our being 
and in performing free acts. It is a given that is just as immediate as our own 
existence is. 
We can reach this knowledge of the real existence of our freedom in actu-
ally experiencing it from within – as part of the indubitable evidence of the 
cogito. It can be known with the same immediacy as our own existence, or in 
a sense even more immediately, because, as Augustine says, even if we were 
mistaken, per impossibile, about our own existence, it would still be evident to 
us that we would not want to be deceived, and in this will not to be deceived we 
experience the evidence of our freedom. Of course, objectively speaking, the 
knowledge of the real existence of our freedom depends on the evidence of 
our existence in the Cogito, sum, but it is concretized in such a way that we can 
clearly understand that the evidence for this knowledge somehow exceeds 
that for any other knowledge.44 
Thus we may say that nothing is more evident to us than our freedom: our 
very existence and conscious life are not more indubitably given, though per-
44Augustine, De libero arbitrio 2; De civitate Dei V. See also Descartes, Discours de la 
Methode; Meditationes de Prima Philosophia. See likewise Balthasar, Theodramatik II 186 ff; 
TheoLogik 1. In the Italian translation of this work by Sommavilla: Verità del Mondo. TeoLogica 
96 ff. See also Hengstenberg 11 ff., where he analyzes a similar ineluctable givenness of moral good 
and evil, a sort of cogito-argument for the givenness of good and evil. See also Seifert, “To Be a 
Person – To Be Free.”
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haps more easily understood, than our freedom. And indeed we know of our 
freedom with the same type of immediate and thereupon reflective evidence 
with which we know of our own existence.45 The awareness of our own free 
will – a knowledge which is so evident that it cannot be a deception – is in fact 
part of the evidence of the famous Cogito in René Descartes and even more in 
its richer and more adequate Augustinian version.46 And the existence of free 
will in us is so evident that its evidence in a certain sense is more primary and 
indubitable than that of all other evident truths given in the Cogito.
Of course, this priority is not to be understood absolutely, for without the 
evidence of our existence and thinking activity our freedom and will could not 
be given as well. Nevertheless, Augustine’s remark is valid secundum quid, in the 
following sense: that if we assumed, per impossibile, that all other truths given in 
the Cogito could be doubtful, we could still be certain that we would freely want 
and wish to avoid error and to reach the truth. For even if we could be in error 
about all things, it would still remain true that we do not want to be in error, 
and of this free will we can have certain knowledge. As Augustine states:
Likewise if someone were to say: ‘I do not will to err,’ will it not be true that 
whether he errs or does not err, yet he does not will to err? Would it not be the 
height of impudence of anyone to say to this man: ‘Perhaps you are deceived,’ 
since no matter in what he may be deceived, he is certainly not deceived in 
not willing to be deceived? And if he says that he knows this, he adds as many 
known things as he pleases, and perceives it to be an infinite number. For 
he who says, ‘I do not will to be deceived, and I know that I do not will this, 
45Investigating this matter more closely, we could distinguish different levels of the evident 
givenness of freedom: a) in the immediate inner conscious living of our acts, b) in what Karol 
Wojtyìa calls “reflective consciousness” (which precedes the fully conscious self-knowledge), c) in 
explicit reflection and self-knowledge properly speaking in which we make our personal freedom 
the explicit object of reflection, d) in the insight into the nature of freedom, an insight which grasps 
the necessary and intelligible essence of personhood, which is realized in each and every person, 
and e) in the clear and indubitable recognition of our personal individual freedom, an evident 
knowledge which depends, on the one hand, on the immediate and reflected experience of our being 
and freedom, and, on the other hand, on the essential insight into the eternal and evident truth of 
the connection between freedom and personhood. See all of this in the development of the Cogito-
Argument in Seifert, Back to Things in Themselves.
46See Hölscher. See also the discussion of this in Seifert, Back to Things in Themselves ch. 4–5.
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and I know that I know this,’ can also continue from here towards an infinite 
number, however awkward this manner of expressing it may be.47
And again Augustine says:
On the other hand who would doubt that he … wills…? For even if he doubts, 
he…wants (wills) to be certain….48
René Descartes gains the same insight as Augustine and expresses it in the 
following way, as Sophie Berman well explains, citing a very beautiful text 
of Descartes49:
47Item si quispiam dicat, errare nolo; nonne sive erret sive non erret, errare 
tamen eum nolle verum erit? Quis est qui huic non impudentissime dicat, 
Forsitan falleris? cum profecto ubicumque fallatur, falli se tamen nolle non 
fallitur. Et si hoc scire se dicat, addit quantum vult rerum numerum cognitarum, 
et numerum esse perspicit infinitum. Qui enim dicit, Nolo me falli et hoc me 
nolle scio, et hoc me scire scio; jam et si non commoda elocutione, potest hinc 
infinitum numerum ostendere. (Augustine, De Trinitate XV, xii, 21)
48See the full text:
Vivere se tamen et meminisse, et intelligere, et velle, et cogitare, et scire, et 
judicare quis dubitet? Quandoquidem etiam si dubitat, vivit; si dubitat, unde 
dubitet, meminit; si dubitat, dubitare se intelligit; si dubitat, certus esse vult; 
si dubitat, cogitat; si dubitat, scit se nescire; si dubitat, judicat non se temere 
consentire oportere. Quisquis igitur aliunde dubitat, de his omnibus dubitare 
non debet: quae si non essent, de ulla re dubitare non posset. 
On the other hand who would doubt that he lives, remembers, understands, 
wills, thinks, knows, and judges? For even if he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, 
he remembers why he doubts; if he doubts, he understands that he doubts; if 
he doubts, he wants (wills) to be certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, 
he knows that he does not know; if he doubts, he judges that he ought not to 
consent rashly. Whoever then doubts about anything else ought never to doubt 
about all of these; for if they were not, he would be unable to doubt about 
anything at all. (The Trinity 480–2)
49See her article “Human Freedom in Anselm and Descartes” 5.
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[the free will] cannot be forced by any external power to choose what it does 
not want. That we possess such freedom of choice, [Descartes] says, ‘is so 
evident that it must be counted among the first and most common notions 
that are innate in us.’50
Thus, starting from the immediate self-experience of our conscious life, we 
gain the evidence that we possess the freedom to will not to err, and in a simi-
lar manner proceed to the more general evident knowledge of our freedom 
expressed by Augustine thus:
for we do many things which, if we were not willing, we should certainly not 
do. This is primarily true of the act of willing itself—for if we will, it is; if we 
will not, it is not...
Augustine continues a little further down:
Our wills, therefore, exist as wills, and do themselves whatever we do by will-
ing, and which would not be done if we were unwilling.51
The evidence of this knowledge cannot even be refuted by any and all pos-
sible forms of self-deception because these already imply or presuppose the 
evidence of free will, particularly the evidence that we can will “not to be 
deceived,” as Augustine says.52 
50See Descartes, Principles of Philosophy I, 39.
51(Emphasis mine). See Augustine, The City of God 156–57. Kant, too, when he expresses the 
profound puzzle of such an absolute beginning of causality in freedom, refers to this relationship—
mentioned by Plato—between the essence of freedom and a first mover (Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason B 478).
52Cf. Hildebrand, “Das Cogito und die Erkenntnis.” See also Seifert, Back to Things in 
Themselves.
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b. the Evidence of Our Own Freedom in the Light of the “Eternal truths” or 
“Necessary and supremely Intelligible Essences and Wesensgesetze”
An extremely important advantage of the Augustinian over the Cartesian 
Cogito lies in Augustine‘s clear grasp that the unique inner perception that we 
really exist through our intimate conscious contact with our being and life 
“from within” is connected with the light of eternal truths, with an insight 
into necessary essences and states of affairs that are independent from our 
individual person but without knowledge of which we could also not under-
stand the existence of anything. An example would be that we do not only 
immediately perceive from within that we live and are conscious but we un-
derstand at the same time the universal truth of the principle of contradiction, 
that “nothing can exist and not exist at the same time and in the same sense,” 
or, alternatively, that “deception and error requires the real existence of the 
person who errs or is deceived; therefore, nobody who errs and is deceived 
can fail to exist.” And as we perceive the concrete fact of our own existence in 
the light of these eternal truths, so can we also perceive our own freedom in 
the light of the eternal truths about the essence of freedom that we discussed 
above. Thus we could arrive at the following formulation: in understanding 
what freedom is, we at the same time perceive in ourselves the actually existing 
power to act freely. The light of the insights into the universal facts about 
the nature of freedom at the same time allows us to understand clearly the 
instantiation of freedom in our own being and conscious life.
C. the Knowledge of Freedom through the Mediation of the Experience of 
Moral Calls and Oughts
There is another way to know that we are free:53 we all feel that we ought 
to do and not to do certain things. Not only is an ought senseless without 
53Kant insisted on this second way even though he profoundly misinterpreted and interpreted 
his insight in a subjectivist manner. Among the many instances of this would be:
etzet, daß jemand von seiner wollüstigen Neigung vorgiebt, sie sei, wenn ihm 
der beliebte Gegenstand und die Gelegenheit dazu vorkämen, für ihn ganz 
unwiderstehlich: ob, wenn ein Galgen vor dem Hause, da er diese Gelegenheit 
trifft, aufgerichtet wäre, um ihn sogleich nach genossener Wollust daran zu 
knüpfen, er alsdann nicht seine Neigung bezwingen würde. Man darf nicht 
lange rathen, was er antworten würde. Fragt ihn aber, ob, wenn sein Fürst 
ihm unter Androhung derselben unverzögerten Todesstrafe zumuthete, ein 
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freedom, we actually experience freedom as co-given with the ought itself. 
In a similar way,54 the call issuing from values for us to give them their due 
response—which is, as a matter of fact, the main rational reason for an ought—
cannot be perceived without at the same time knowing our freedom, without 
which we could never duly respond to the call. For while we can also give an 
affective response—one that is not within our free power to engender and yet 
is still due to a great work of art or to a beloved person—this due response 
still calls for a free sanction without which our response does not enter fully 
in relation with due-ness. Thus in the experience of any “ought” or call to give 
a due response, we are given in the same evidence with which we know that we 
ought to do or to omit something, or to perform an inner act due to a beautiful 
or good object or person, our freedom as well. Freedom is the only conceiv-
able addressee of an ought or call for a due response. No conceivable unfree 
reaction can ever refer to an ought or to a call from a value per se. We can thus 
say that nobody can know of an ought or a call to give an adequate response 
to a good without knowing that she is free; hence in knowing such oughts 
and calls for a due response, we also know that we are free.
d. A “transcendental” Proof of Freedom or “Freedom as an undeniable 
truth”55
A fourth kind of argument on behalf of our freedom is the objectivist 
transcendental argument that everybody who denies freedom already presup-
poses it. We presuppose in the act of denying freedom and in insisting that 
we and everyone else should recognize the truth that there is no freedom, the 
evidence that we and other persons are free. And it is only for that reason we 
falsches Zeugniß wider einen ehrlichen Mann, den er gerne unter scheinbaren 
Vorwänden verderben möchte, abzulegen, ob er da, so groß auch seine Liebe 
zum Leben sein mag, sie wohl zu überwinden für möglich halte. Ob er es thun 
würde, oder nicht, wird er vielleicht sich nicht getrauen zu versichern; daß 
es ihm aber möglich sei, muß er ohne Bedenken einräumen. Er urtheilt also, 
daß er etwas kann, darum weil er sich bewußt ist, daß er es soll, und erkennt 
in sich die Freiheit, die ihm sonst ohne das moralische Gesetz unbekannt 
geblieben wäre. (Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft 6)
54Hildebrand has shown as well in his Ethics ch. 1–3; 17–18, that this is the deepest source of any 
ought: to give a good endowed with intrinsic values a response due to it, but that there are also other 
sources of an ought, for example freely-entered commitments, promises, etc. See Hildebrand, Moralia.
55On such veritá innegabili (undeniable truths), see also Reale.
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can possibly have a moral responsibility towards ourselves and towards others 
to publicize this alleged truth. We can thus see that in all of these judgments 
in which we reject freedom we actually contradict our deterministic view and 
presuppose the evidence of freedom. An excellent form of this kind of “tran-
scendental argument” for freedom and against determinism can be found in 
Hans Jonas, who in his book Macht oder Ohnmacht der Subjektivität, brilliantly 
refutes the materialist ontology and the deterministic account of mind.56 Jonas 
opens his book by relating the historical fact that a group of young physiolo-
gists (students of the famous Johannes Müller) met regularly in the house of 
the physicist Gustav Magnus in Berlin. Two of them (Ernst Brücke and Emil 
du Bois-Reymond) made a formal pact to spread the truth “that no other forces 
are at work in the organism except chemical-physical ones.” Before long even 
the young Helmholtz joined them in this solemn promise. Later all three men 
became famous in their fields and remained faithful to their agreement.
Jonas shows, however, that the very fact of this promise already contra-
dicted, without them noticing it, the very content of their promise, or rather, 
the materialist theory and negation of freedom which they pledged to promote 
throughout their career. For they did not bind themselves, and could not have 
bound themselves, to leave to the molecules of their brain their respective 
course of action because the course of molecular events in their brains, ac-
cording to their opinion, was wholly determined since the beginning of the 
world. They could not have bound themselves by means of their promise to 
allow these molecules to determine all their speaking and thinking in the 
future. (This would have been equally senseless for the same reasons.) Rather, 
they pledged fidelity to their present insight or more accurately, to their false 
opinion. They declared by their pact, at least for themselves, that their sub-
jectivity was master over their action. In the very act of making this promise 
they trusted something entirely non-physical, namely their relationship to 
what they took to be the truth and to their freedom to decide over their action. 
Moreover, they ascribed precisely to this factor a determining power over their 
brains and bodies – a power, however, that had been denied by the content of 
their thesis. To promise something, with the essentially included conviction of 
being able to keep such a promise and likewise being free to break it, admits 
the force of freedom at work “in the organism” of man. Faithfulness to one’s 
56It is regrettable that he did not explicitly reject the kind of biologistic monism he defended in 
some of his earlier essays, as those collected in The Phenomenon of Life.
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promise is such a force. Thus, the very “act of vowing always to deny freedom 
and any non-physical force” solemnly confirmed the existence of the freedom 
and the “non-physical forces” that they denied!
E. the Evidence of Freedom Obtained by the Experience of Acts whose 
Objects (Persons and their Acts) Presuppose Freedom
A fifth way to reach the knowledge that human persons are free is to in-
vestigate the ontological and anthropological conditions of acts directed at us 
or at other persons, as well as the evidence regarding their object and subject 
upon which these acts are based. Thus one could show how not only the act 
of vowing or promising, but also the essentially self-directed act of repentance 
of one’s own sins57 or the essentially other-directed act of gratitude or forgive-
ness, and many further fundamental human acts, all presuppose the evidence 
of freedom not only in the subject-person but also in the object-person of 
these acts. We find the act of gratitude, for example, rooted in the evidence 
of freedom of both the subject-person (since a forced gratitude would be no 
gratitude at all, but would be like “wooden iron”) and of the object-person to 
whom we are grateful and who gave us a freely given gift.58 It would be sense-
less to thank anybody if we did not understand and believe that she acted 
freely as well as kindly towards us or to persons dear to us. We cannot thank 
a machine or marionette. In the act of repenting we also find the evidence of 
our freedom at its root: it would be absolutely senseless to repent what our 
nature compelled us to do. Likewise, when we forgive some wrong done to 
us by another person, we necessarily presuppose and also possess a certain 
degree of evidence that she is a free agent.59 The same is true when we exhort 
or praise, admonish, chide, condemn, or encourage her.
57See Scheler, “Reue und Wiedergeburt”; see also Selected Philosophical Essays which 
contains “The Idols of Self-Knowledge,” “Ordo Amoris,” “Phenomenology and Theory of 
Knowledge,” “The Theory of the Three Facts,” and “Idealism and Realism.” See likewise Crosby 
(ed.), Max Scheler, especially, Seifert, “Scheler on Repentance.”
58See Seneca, De Beneficiis III.xvii.3-4; also III. xix. 1: “Beneficium enim id est, quod quis 
dedit, cum illi liceret et non dare.” 
59See Schwarz: “Über die Dankbarkeit.”/“Del agradecimiento”; “Der Dank als Gesinnung 
und Tat”; “Some Reflections on Gratitude”; “Réflexions sur la gratitude et l’admiration.” See 
likewise Seifert, “Phänomenologie der Dankbarkeit ”and “From a Phenomenology of Gratitude to 
a Personalistic Metaphysics.” See also Crespo.
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Hence, through this five-fold way we can indeed know that we are free 
and thus unambiguously answer our title-question: “Yes, we are free!” All of 
us, deep down inside, know from childhood on this immensely important 
truth that philosophy can only bring out from the dark into the light, as a 
midwife helps the already existing child to reach the light of the day. So I 
hope that you have arrived at a clearer understanding of what you knew all 
along: “Yes, I am free!”
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